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Abstract 
In this paper, we explore the synergies and tradeoffs between abatement of global and local pollution. 
We built a unique dataset of Swedish heat and power plants with detailed boiler-level data 2001-2009 
on not only production and inputs but also emissions of CO2 and NOx. Both pollutants are subject to 
strict policies in Sweden. CO2 is subject to multiple levels of governance using environmental 
instruments such as the EU ETS and Swedish carbon taxes; NOx – as a precursor of acid rain and 
eutrophication – is regulated by a heavy fee. Using a quadratic directional output distance function, we 
characterize changes in technical efficiency as well as patterns of substitutability in response to the 
policies mentioned. The fact that generating units face a trade-off between the pollutants indicates a 
need for policy coordination. 
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I. Introduction 
This paper deals with both the interaction between multiple layers of regulation and the 
interaction between multiple pollutants. Climate change policy is affected by multiple decision makers 
at local, subnational, national, and transnational levels. Usually, these decision makers are not fully 
coordinated with respect to goals and methods, and the existence of several layers of governance may 
encourage strategic behavior from powerful local actors trying to enhance their own positions 
(Nijkamp and Rietveld, 1981, Caillaud et al., 1996, Eichner and Pethig, 2009). Multi-level climate 
change governance is also related to governance of local air pollutants since production processes 
often involve emitting several air pollutants simultaneously. Environmental policies aiming at 
reducing CO2 emissions might therefore create spillovers, i.e., decreases or increases in emissions of 
other pollutants from firms changing or modifying their production processes in response to climate 
policy. For example, a common strategy to reduce CO2 emissions is switching the fuel mix from fuel 
oil towards bio-fuels. However, while net CO2 emissions do fall dramatically with biofuels, they often 
imply an increase in nitrogen oxides (NOx), particulate matter (PM), carbon monoxide (CO), and 
volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions (Brännlund and Kriström, 2001, Burtraw et al., 2003). 
 The aim of the present paper is to study the effects of the interaction between the European 
Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), the Swedish CO2 tax and a refundable charge on NOx 
on the relative performance of Swedish plants with respect to CO2 and NOx emissions.  For this 
purpose, we built a unique dataset of Swedish heat and power plants for the period 2001-2009 that 
contains detailed boiler-level data not only on production and inputs but also on the two pollutants: 
CO2 and NOx. We use a quadratic directional output distance function to study and compare patterns 
of technical progress, substitution between CO2 and NOx, and shadow prices of these pollutants 
between the periods 2001-2004 and 2006-2009. 
 Our choice of country and pollutants is motivated by the availability and stringency of 
environmental policies. The Swedish government has long been at the forefront of GHG emissions 
reduction, and the country is one of few that present emissions below the level recorded in 1990, 
which is mainly explained by a number of initiatives taken in order to reduce CO2 emissions. In 1991, 
for example, Sweden was the first country in the world to introduce a carbon tax based on the carbon 
content of various fuels. Thus, the tax is relatively high on coal, lower on oil, and lower still on natural 
gas, whereas biofuels such as wood and ethanol are exempt. Since 2005, most installations within the 
heat and power sector are part of the EU ETS – the cornerstone of the European Union's policy to 
combat climate change. 
 The main function of the carbon tax is to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by reducing the 
demand for the taxed fuels. The EU ETS has the same purpose, but unlike the carbon tax it does not 
cover all sectors of the economy. Hence, insofar as the carbon tax and the emissions trading scheme 
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do not overlap, they complement one another. Nevertheless, from 2005 to 2008, heat and power 
installations were not exempt from the carbon tax; they continued to pay the tax (although at a reduced 
rate) and also took part in emissions trading. To address the potentially negative effect of policy 
overlapping on the competitiveness of the Swedish industry, the government took the first step 
towards abolishing the CO2 tax within the EU ETS on July 2008, a still ongoing process.  
The most obvious effect of the carbon tax and the EU ETS has been the expansion of biomass 
use. Indeed, fuel substitution seems to have played the most important role for reduction of carbon 
emissions in Sweden (Löfgren and Muller, 2010), with the potential negative side effect of increased 
NOx emissions. Since Sweden has ecosystems that are naturally very sensitive to acidification, the 
country has a very aggressive policy on the precursors, notably NOx. Indeed, to reduce the emissions 
of this pollutant, a heavy refundable charge has been in place since 1992. A significant reduction in 
NOx emission was noted after the implementation of the NOx charge. In fact, NOx emissions 
decreased much faster than expected; the initial target of achieving a 35% reduction from 1990 levels 
by 1995 was achieved already in 1993. However, the path of reduction did not show significant 
progress during the last decade, and hence, the charge level was raised in 2008 to encourage further 
NOx reductions. 
 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study analyzing and quantifying the effects of the 
multi-governance of climate change policy and its interaction with the other national policy 
instruments aimed to reduce local pollutants. However, some previous studies have employed 
directional output distance functions to analyze the technological non-separability and substitutability 
among air and water pollutants (see, e.g., Murty et al., 2007, Kumar and Managi, 2011, and Färe et al., 
2012). In this regard, perhaps the most closely related work is Färe et al. (2005), who use a quadratic 
directional output distance function to estimate the shadow price of SO2 and the output substitution 
between electricity and SO2 before and after the implementation of Phase I of the Acid Rain Program 
in United States. Unlike Färe et al. (2005), we focus on policy-induced substitutability across 
pollutants and the changes in the relative prices of emissions introduced by environmental multi-level 
governance. 
To what extent could an increased relative CO2/NOx price have contributed to 
increased/decreased emissions of NOx? If the joint abatement creates some synergies, pollutants can 
be considered as complements in the abatement process. Instead, if CO2 emissions are reduced at the 
cost of increasing NOx emissions, they can be considered as substitutes. Theory shows that an 
increased relative CO2/NOx price might lead NOx emissions either to increase or decrease depending 
on whether NOx is a substitute or a complement to CO2 (see Ambec and Coria, 2011). Technological 
progress does, however, also play an important role as it might lead to reduced emissions of one or all 
pollutants. Hence, even in the case that pollutants are substitutes, the final effect on emissions would 
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depend on the direction of technological progress (i.e., CO2 and/or NOx saving) and on whether the 
technological progress outweighs the substitution effect.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly describes the climate and NOx policies in 
Sweden and the changes in the relative price of CO2 to NOx over the period 2001-2009. Section III 
presents the theoretical and empirical framework of the joint production of heat and power, CO2 and 
NOx emissions. Section IV discusses the data and the empirical results. Finally, Section V concludes 
the paper. 
 
II. Climate and NOx Policy in Sweden:  Carbon Tax, EU ETS, and the Refundable NOx Charge 
 Since the climate challenge discussion in the 1980s had largely focused on oil substitution, 
Sweden reformed its taxation system in 1991, introducing a carbon tax specifically designed to 
discourage oil use. Thus, it was directly connected to the carbon content of the fuel (see Figure 1), 
though still allowing for some differentiation among sectors. For example, there is no carbon tax on 
electricity production, but non-industrial consumers have to pay a tax on electricity consumption. 
Initially, the general tax was equivalent to 25 €/ ton of CO2. However, it has increased steadily over 
the last decade, and at present, it corresponds to 105 €/ ton. This is by all accounts a very high – some 
would say extreme – carbon tax. To put it into context, the carbon dioxide permits on US markets such 
as RGGI and Chicago are trading at around 4 €/ ton; the EU ETS has varied around a mean of 15-20 €/ 
ton; and France tried to introduce a carbon tax of 17 €/ ton, but failed due to fears that such a level 
would be detrimental to the economy.   
 Since the tax is very high and Sweden is a small open economy, there has been quite some 
concern about the competitiveness of some energy-intensive industries. Thus, a number of deductions 
and exemptions have been created in sectors that are open to competition, and a series of reduced rates 
have been introduced. In the case of the heat and power sector, the carbon tax varies according to the 
type of generation. As mentioned in the introduction, until July 2008 the carbon tax and the EU ETS 
overlapped. At that time, the tax was in principle replaced by the EU ETS (see Figure 1). Combined 
heat and power plants (hereinafter CHP)
 
were granted a tax reduction of 85%, while district heating 
plants (hereinafter DH) were granted a reduction of only 6%.1  Since the level of the permit price is 
much lower than the Swedish tax level, this harmonization with the EU actually implies a sizeable fall 
in the price of carbon emissions for some Swedish plants.  
                                                          
1
 A CHP is a generating unit that produces heat and electricity simultaneously. A DH generating unit only 
produces heat (for district heating – and is thus almost completely sheltered from competition). Cogeneration has 
been promoted within the European Union as an effective means to increase the overall energy efficiency (EU 
Directive 2004/8/EC). A highly efficient CHP can use 10% less fuel than would be used by separate production 
of the same quantities of heat and electricity (Swedish Energy Agency, 2009). In Sweden, approximately 30-
50% of the total input energy of a CHP is converted to electricity; the rest becomes heat (Svensk Fjärrvärme, 
2011).  
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 Indeed, regarding the prices of CO2 allowances in the EU ETS, they have faced a great deal of 
variation since the launch of the first phase. They started around 5 €/ton but quickly increased to 20-30 
€/ton, peaking at over 30 €/ton early in 2006. However, the prices fell dramatically in 2006 as it 
became clear that the market was long on allowances. Since the very low allowance prices in Phase I 
(2005-2007) could jeopardize the credibility of the trading scheme, the European Commission 
tightened the cap for the second trading period. After remaining at levels of 22-23 €/ton in early 2008, 
the CO2 price dropped during the market crash. Although the fundamentals of the carbon market in 
the road ahead to Phase III remain unchanged, the CO2 price is somewhat volatile, depending in the 
short run on both fuel prices and international climate negotiations. In 2011, for instance, the CO2 
price peaked in April after the German decision to phase out nuclear power. It then decreased after 
June of the same year when the European Commission proposed a mandatory target for energy 
efficiency improvements, and shot up again with increasing gas and power prices in August.  
 
(INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE) 
 The 1991 tax reform introduced not only carbon taxes but also other taxes, including a high fee 
on NOx. The fee was initially confined to all NOx emissions from electricity and heat-producing 
boilers, stationary combustion engines and gas turbines with a useful energy production of at least 50 
gigawatt hours (GWh) per year (approx. 182 boilers). Nevertheless, because of its effectiveness in 
emission reduction and simultaneously falling monitoring costs, in 1996 the charge system was 
extended to include all boilers producing at least 40 GWh and in 1997 the limit was lowered to 25 
GWh.  
 The total collected NOx fees are returned to the participating plants
2
 in proportion to their 
production of useful energy. Hence, the system encourages plants to reduce NOx emissions per unit of 
energy to the largest possible extent, since plants with lower emissions relative to energy output are 
net receivers. The fee was originally set at 4.3 €/kg – which again is an extremely high level compared 
to other countries. The figure corresponds to 4,300 €/ton, which can be compared to the Taxe 
Parafiscale in France of 40.85 €/ton, the Norwegian fee of 525 €/ton, or the summer seasonal NOx 
emissions trading program price in the US of approximately 600 €/ton.3 The tax refund varies from 
year to year, but in recent years it has been around 0.9 €/megawatt hour (MWh) of useful energy, 
while the average NOx emissions per unit of energy has been 0.23 kilograms of NOx per MWh.  
The Swedish NOx charge has been evaluated extensively (see, e.g., Höglund, 2005; Sterner and 
Höglund, 2006; and Sterner and Turnheim, 2009), and has then been shown to reduce emissions very 
effectively. The empirical findings suggest that extensive emission reductions have been achieved as a 
                                                          
2
 With the exception of the 0.7 percent that is kept for administrative costs. 
3
 Price in 2008. NOx prices have dropped dramatically since then to approx. 12 €/ton in 2011. 
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result of learning and technological development in abatement. NOx is produced largely from an 
unintended chemical reaction between nitrogen and oxygen in the combustion chamber. The process is 
quite non-linear in temperature and other parameters of the combustion process, which implies that 
there is a large scope for NOx reduction through various technical measures (including changing the 
shape, temperature, or oxygen and moisture content of the combustion chamber), fuel switching, and 
other abatement strategies including the addition of ammonia or passing exhaust through catalytic 
converters (Millock and Sterner, 2004). Adoption of NOx reduction technologies has been a major 
driver of emissions reduction. Nevertheless, emissions fell mostly in the early years. The decrease has 
continued since then, but at a reduced pace. Hence, in 2008 the Swedish government decided to raise 
the tax to 5.3 €/kg to foster further adoption of more effective treatment techniques (SEPA, 2003, 
2007).   
How have all the regulations described above affected the relative cost of CO2 and NOx 
emissions? To assess the overall picture is not easy. Despite the fact that large industrial plants in the 
energy sector can to some extent adjust their technology in response to short-run price variations (for 
instance through fuel switching), many features of their design take a decade to build and are adapted 
to expected price trends over a longer time horizon (though clearly, the ability to switch fuels may 
well be one such feature). Furthermore, the carbon tax paid and allowances used depend on the type of 
fuel being burned, which is endogenous to the stringency of CO2 policies in previous years. Due to the 
large fraction of boilers in the heat and power sector fully relying on biofuels, the actual payment of 
CO2 regulations is close to zero. Hence, the actual cost of this regulation to generating units would 
provide a misleading estimate of the real opportunity cost.  
Nevertheless, in order to provide an indication of the relative stringency of CO2 and NOx 
policies, we compute the relative opportunity cost of CO2 and NOx emissions per unit of output. As 
shown in Figure 2, it seems clear that Swedish policy signals have encouraged power companies to 
avoid fossil fuels. The opportunity cost of CO2 emissions is much larger than the cost of emitting 
NOx. For example, in 2003, an average CHP plant emitted 0.082 tons of CO2 and 0.248 kilograms of 
NOx to produce 1 Mwh of useful energy. Given the magnitude of the carbon tax and NOx fee at that 
time, this implied a cost of 6.116 and 0.936 €/Mwh, respectively. This is to say that the opportunity 
cost of CO2 emissions per unit of output was 6.54 times the cost of NOx emissions. The figure is 
similar for DH plants, as the opportunity cost of CO2 emissions per unit of output in 2003 was 4.58 
times the cost of NOx emissions. 
Moreover, the variation observed in Figure 2 suggests that CO2 policy, on average, did become 
more stringent (relative to NOx) immediately after the introduction of the EU ETS, yet since 2008 it 
has become less stringent due to the carbon tax phase-out. Indeed, the relative CO2/NOx opportunity 
cost has decreased for both an average DH and an average CHP after 2008 as a result of the reduction 
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in the share of the carbon tax paid by the heat and power sector, though this effect is rather modest for 
DH plants as they continued to pay 94% of the carbon tax. In the case of the CHP plants, the reduction 
started earlier as they were granted a significant carbon tax reduction already in 2004. Moreover, 
Sweden increased the NOx charge for all regulated boilers in 2008, adding to the effect of the reduced 
carbon tax on the relative CO2/NOx opportunity cost.  
It is clear that most abatement efforts should focus on reducing CO2 emissions as the economic 
effect of CO2 regulations on firms‟ profitability is much larger than that of NOx regulation. However, 
the variations in the opportunity costs of CO2 and NOx emissions should induce some variations in 
the relative CO2-NOx abatement efforts if generating units want to minimize the cost of compliance 
with environmental regulations. The magnitude and direction of the changes on the optimal mix of 
CO2-NOx emissions would depend, however, on a series of factors, including technological 
development and whether CO2 and NOx are substitutes or complements in abatement. For instance, in 
the absence of technological development, one would expect NOx emissions from CHPs to decrease 
to a relatively larger extent during the period 2006-2009 than during the period 2001-2004 if 
pollutants are substitutes, while the reverse should hold if pollutants are complements. For DH plants, 
the trend should be the opposite: the mean CO2/NOx opportunity cost was overall larger during the 
period 2006-2009, which should have triggered more efforts to reduce CO2 emissions compared to 
NOx if these pollutants are substitutes.  
On the other hand, the high relative opportunity cost of CO2 emissions should also trigger 
technological fixes and fuel switching aiming to reduce them. For instance, CO2 emissions can be 
reduced by raising combustion temperature – but this increases NOx emissions. Alternatively, NOx 
emissions can be reduced through post combustion measures, yet such measures usually require 
energy and thus increase carbon emissions (or reduce output). Hence, given the relatively stringency 
of CO2-NOx regulations, we should expect technological development to be overall biased toward 
CO2 emissions reductions. In the following sections, we will use a quadratic directional output 
distance function to derive the relative shadow prices of emissions for each generating unit and 
analyze the changes on technical efficiency and abatement efforts induced by the regulatory changes, 
but first we will describe the estimation strategy.   
 
 
(INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE) 
  
 
III. Estimation Strategy and Data 
In our approach, we employ the directional output distance function to derive estimates of 
technical efficiencies, pollutant-output elasticities of substitution, elasticities of substitution between 
pollutants, and relative CO2/NOx shadow prices. This function seeks the simultaneous expansion of 
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good outputs and contraction of bad outputs, which is very suitable to our case, i.e., modeling the 
technology in this manner allows for the adoption of abatement measures in order to reduce the bad 
outputs (emissions) while increasing, or holding constant, the production of heat and power.   
 
 
3.1 Theoretical Background  
Following Färe et al. (2005), we treat emissions as bad or undesirable outputs generated in the 
boilers‟ combustion process and model jointly the production of heat and power and emissions (see 
Färe et al., 2005 for details).  
Let the set of output possibilities  ( )  *(   )               (   )+  represent all feasible 
input-output possibilities of boilers that jointly generate heat and/or power (y) and CO2 and NOx 
emissions (denoted   (     ) , respectively) using an input vector   (         )  containing 
installed capacity, fuel consumption (as input energy), and labor, respectively. We assume that P(x) is 
compact and that inputs are strongly disposable, which implies that the output set is not shrinking if 
the inputs are expanding. Furthermore, we assume null-jointness, implying that no good output is 
produced without bad outputs.
4
 Moreover, all outputs are assumed to be jointly weakly disposable. 
That is, for a given input vector, reduction in emissions is feasible if good output is proportionally 
reduced.
 5
 In other words, emissions can be reduced at the expense of reduced output. Finally, we 
consider that the good output is strongly disposable
6
, i.e., it is always possible to reduce the good 
output without reductions in undesirable outputs for a feasible good and bad output vector. The 
directional output distance function is characterized as follows: 
 
 ⃗  (       )     {  (           )   ( )}, (1) 
where   (     ) is the directional vector and  
   ⃗  (       ). Equation (1) is a functional 
representation of the technology that is consistent with P(x) and its associated properties. For a given 
g>0, the function finds the simultaneous maximum expansion in good output and contraction in 
undesirable outputs. In this sense, if a generating unit that produces a particular combination of b and y 
outputs were to work efficiently, it could expand the good output and contract the bad outputs along 
the g direction until reaching the boundary of P(x) at (           
   ).  
                                                          
4
 Formally null-jointness implies that if (   )   ( ) and    , then    . 
5
 Under weak disposability, if (   )   ( ) and      , then (     )   ( ).  
6
 Free disposability of output can be expressed as: if (   )   ( ) and (    )  (   ), then (    )   ( ). In a 
similar manner, strong disposability of inputs can be written as: if     , then  (  )   ( ). 
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The directional output distance function has several properties: (i) It is non-negative for feasible 
output vectors.
7
 Thus, the function takes the value of zero for generating units with observed output 
vectors operating with maximum technical efficiency on the frontier of P(x), or takes positive values 
for generating units operating with inefficient output vectors in the interior of P(x). So the function 
provides scores of technical and environmental efficiency, where higher values of  ⃗  (       ) 
indicate higher inefficiency. This also satisfies monotonicity, i.e., (ii) it is non-decreasing in 
undesirable outputs, (iii) non-increasing in good output, and (iv) non-decreasing in inputs. Moreover, 
it is (v) concave in (   ), and fulfills (vi) weak disposability of good output and bad outputs and (vii) 
null-jointness. (viii) Additionally, the directional output distance function by definition satisfies the 
translation property, expressed as  ⃗  (               )   ⃗  (       )         .
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The directional output distance function approach allows us not only to account for technical 
efficiency but also to calculate the elasticity of substitution between CO2 and NOx emissions and the 
relative shadow prices of these pollutants. Regarding the former, the Morishima elasticity of 
substitution provides us with information about how much the relative shadow prices of outputs will 
change in response to changes in emission intensities (see Blackorby and Russell, 1981, 1989). In the 
context of the technology described by the directional output distance function in (1), the Morishima 
elasticity of substitution between pollutants    and    can be expressed as      
 
      
    (    ⁄ )
    (    ⁄ )
   
  (
     
   
 
     
   
)        ( ) 
and between pollutant    (with i=1,2) and good output it is 
 
     
    (   ⁄ )
    (   ⁄ )
    (
    
   
 
   
  
)          ( ) 
 
where    (     ) denotes the emissions price vector containing CO2 and NOx prices, respectively, 
and   denotes the output price.     and    are the first order derivatives of  ⃗
 
 (       ) with respect 
to pollutant    and good output, respectively;      ,      ,      and     are second order derivatives 
of the directional output distance function;       ⃗  (       ) and   
      ⃗  (       ). If 
       , then    and    are Morishima substitutes. That is, the pollutants are substitutes if the 
                                                          
7
 This feature of the directional output distance function is related with the property that P(x) or  ⃗  (       ) 
can equivalently describe the technology, which is valid if g-disposability is satisfied; i.e., if  (   )   ( ),  
then (         )   ( ). 
8
 The translation property is equivalent to homogeneity in outputs of the Shepard‟s (1970) output distance 
function (see Färe et al., 2006). Under this property, the inefficiency can decrease by the amount of   if bad 
outputs are contracted by     and the good output is expanded by    . For a description of the directional 
output distance function‟s properties, see Färe et al. (2005). 
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emission intensity of    relative to     increases when the relative marginal cost of abatement between 
these pollutants (    ⁄ ) decreases; in other words, emissions reductions in    are accompanied by 
increased emissions in   . Conversely,    and    are complements when       . The Morishima 
elasticities are inherently asymmetric (           ), and can be represented as the difference 
between two price elasticities, i.e.,                   where                 ⁄  (Stiroh, 1999, 
page 6). Indeed, consider the effect of a change in the price ratio     ⁄  on the emissions intensity 
    ⁄ . A change in    – holding    constant – has two effects on the quantity ratio: the first term       
shows the effect on   , and the second term      , shows the effect on   . In contrast, a change in    – 
holding    constant – has two different effects on the input quantity ratio, which are given as      
           . There is no a priori reason that these effects should be the same. In terms of the 
analysis, the asymmetric substitutability tells us which pollutant is easier to substitute for another 
pollutant for a fixed amount of output (Stiroh, 1999). 
With regard to pollutant-output elasticities, since  ⃗  (       )  satisfies monotonicity, 
concavity, and translation properties, then      
9
. Higher pollutant-output elasticities in absolute 
values indicate that it is more difficult (or more costly) for the generating units to reduce emissions.   
Regarding shadow prices, it can be shown that for a given vector   (     )  and a 
differentiable directional output distance function, the relative shadow price between undesirable 
outputs is
10
: 
  
  
 
   
   
     . (4) 
The ratio in (4) represents the trade-off between these two pollutants, i.e., the shadow marginal 
rate of transformation. Furthermore, the analog relative shadow price for pollution-good output is 
defined as           ⁄⁄ . The shadow prices are calculated on the technically efficient frontier of 
P(x).
11
  
3.2  Functional Form 
We specify our directional output distance function with a quadratic form. This specification is 
twice differentiable, has a flexible structure that ensures the translation property, and has the 
                                                          
9
 This is because the elasticities are obtained on the boundary along the positively sloped portion of the output 
possibilities set, i.e., when the emissions fulfill weak disposability.  See Färe et al., 2005. 
10
 For a more detailed explanation of the shadow prices approach in the context of the output distance function 
see Färe et al. (1993). For an application in the case of directional output distance functions, see Färe et al. 
(2005).   
11
 It should be noted that due to the translation property of the directional output distance function, the first order 
derivatives and the relative shadow prices calculated at the observed output vectors and their corresponding 
projected output values are the same. 
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advantage that it tends to have a better adjustment than trans-log specifications (Färe et al., 2010). As 
in Färe et al. (2006), our choice of the directional vector is   (   ), i.e., the component of the good 
output and the components of the two pollutants are equal to one, making the model parsimonious. For 
a generating unit k operating at period t, the directional output distance function has the following 
expression:   
 ⃗  
 (  
    
    
     )
   ∑      
 
 
   
     
  ∑     
 
 
   
 
 
 
∑ ∑        
     
 
 
    
 
   
 
 
 
    
  
 
 
 
∑ ∑        
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 ∑    
    
 
 
   
 ∑      
   
 
 
   
     ( ) 
 
with           and          . The following parameter restrictions are imposed to satisfy the 
translation property:  
   ∑     
 
   
     ∑    
 
   
    ∑       
 
    
            ∑                    ( )
 
   
 
Furthermore, symmetry conditions for cross-output and cross-input terms are also assumed: 
           with    
        , and           for    
        . (7) 
We estimate the directional output distance function using a deterministic method, i.e., 
Parametric Linear Programming (PLP), which allows us to impose parametric restrictions that are a 
result of the underlying technology, e.g., monotonicity in good or bad outputs
12
. We follow Aigner and 
Chu‟s (1968) procedure of minimizing the sum of the distance between the frontier technology and the 
actual observations of the generating units in each period. Hence, it chooses the parameters that make 
the generating units as efficient as possible subject to a set of restrictions associated with the 
technology properties already described (see Färe et al., 2001, 2005, 2006). We derive estimates of the 
coefficients for the period of pre-introduction of the EU ETS (2001-2004) and for the post 
implementation period (2006-2009). In order to control for possible yearly changes, e.g., variations in 
weather (some winters may be colder than others) and general shocks of the economy that may affect 
                                                          
12
 The directional output distance function may also be estimated using stochastic approach. Although the 
stochastic frontier method has the advantage of dealing with issues such as measurement errors and also allows 
testing statistical hypotheses within the model, it requires the inclusion of distributional assumptions for the 
inefficiencies scores and residuals that are arbitrary and may be violated. Moreover, with the implementation of 
the stochastic approach is not always possible to satisfy the properties and assumptions of the technology 
described above, e.g., monotonicity in good or bad outputs; properties that cannot be simply introduced in the 
model as linear restrictions of the parameters. 
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heat and power production, we add a group of yearly dummy variables to equation (5). We wrote the 
code to solve the optimization problem in Matlab. All the variables (outputs and inputs) are expressed 
in normalized values with respect to their corresponding means in order to avoid convergence 
problems in the algorithm (see Appendix A for details of the minimization problem).  
Using the estimated coefficients of the directional distance output function, we compute the 
technical and environmental efficiencies and the Morishima elasticities of substitution between CO2 
and NOx and between pollutants and output according to equations (2) and (3), respectively. The 
relative CO2/NOx shadow prices are obtained by applying equation (4). To identify changes in 
efficiencies, elasticities, and relative shadow prices from before to after the EU ETS implementation, 
we compare the density functions of these measures between periods. For that purpose, we employ 
kernel-based methods to statistically test the difference between distributions. Our tests are conducted 
by computing the Tn-statistic of Li et al (2009)
13
, which is a nonparametric consistent test that assesses 
the equality between two density functions,  ( ) and  ( ),of a random variable x (see Appendix B for 
details on the Tn-statistic of Li et al., 2009). Following Hayfield and Racine (2008, 2011), we 
implement this procedure in the software R with 500 bootstrap repetitions and estimate the Tn-statistic 
using a standard normal kernel. The empirical p values of the consistent density equality test are 
computed after bootstrapping. 
3.3  Data 
Our analysis models production and emissions at the boiler level using data of the Swedish heat 
and power sector in 2001-2009. Our measure of good output is the amount of useful energy (MWh) 
commercially sold. The two undesirable outputs, CO2 and NOx emissions, are expressed in tons, and 
as stated above, the inputs are installed capacity (MW), fuel consumption (MWh), and labor (number 
of employees). NOx emissions and useful energy are taken from the Swedish Environmental 
Protection Agency‟s (SEPA) NOx charge database. These two variables are measured and reported to 
the SEPA directly by the generating units along with information about energy fuel shares, installed 
capacity, and the availability of NOx post-combustion (PCT)
14
 and combustion technologies (CT)
15
, 
                                                          
13
 The Tn-statistic of Li et al. (2009) can be used in a broader perspective to test equality of distributions with 
mixed and continuous data. The test of equality of two density functions is just a particular case of it. Unlike the 
T-statistic of Li (1996, 1999), the T-statistic of Li et al. (2009) is not sensitive to the ordering of the data.      
14
 PCT are flue gas treatments that aim to clean up NOx once it has been formed, usually through conversion to 
benign chemical substances. It includes: 1) Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR), the installation of which is 
rather large and costly but yields highly efficient reduction, and 2) Selective Non-Catalytic Reduction (SNCR) of 
chemicals (ex: ammonia, urea, sodium bicarbonate), which implies lower costs than SCR, since there is no need 
to cool the gases or use a catalyst. Although SNCR is less costly than SCR in both capital and operating costs, it 
is less effective (Sterner and Turnheim, 2009).  
15
 CT involves combustion measures that seek to inhibit the formation of thermal and prompt NOx. These 
strategies typically involve optimal control of combustion parameters (temperature, pressure, stoichiometry, 
flame stability and homogeneity, and flue gas residence time) for minimal NOx formation. Fine tuning of 
operational conditions has turned out to be a significant means of abatement (Sterner and Turnheim, 2009). This 
14 
 
among other variables, which makes this dataset unique in the sense that it is the most detailed 
longitudinal database at the boiler level of the Swedish heat and power sector. Installed capacity is 
used as a proxy for capital in physical units. With regard to labor, company-level data were gathered 
from Retriever Bolagsinfo. For multi-unit plants, we allocated labor to generating units according to 
their useful energy ratios. 
Although we have CO2 values from the SEPA‟s EU ETS database, its aggregation at the 
installation level prevents us from recovering the emissions for each boiler. Instead, CO2 emissions 
are estimated based on available data of boilers about energy fuel shares and emission factors per fuel 
type. Hence, we can recover the total energy input that corresponds to the amount of fuel consumed 
per boiler. In addition, our dataset comprises a rich variation in fuel types: gas, oil, coal, peat, biofuel, 
and waste using emission factors for each fuel classification
16
. However, this method only considers 
emissions from fuel used for combustion
17
 and excludes emissions coming from raw materials, which 
are not significant in the case of heat and power generation – unlike other industries such as metal, 
refineries, and chemistry. 
18
 
We focus on boilers that operate every year. This group of generating units represents the 
operation of the sector under normal or standard conditions, i.e., we exclude boilers that may only 
work in certain circumstances (e.g., backup during episodes of very cold winters). In order to allow for 
adjustments at the early stage of the EU ETS, the information for the year 2005 is excluded from the 
sample. Two boilers for which there is a lack of labor data and two boilers for which there is a lack of 
information on fuel shares are dropped. Finally, one boiler using a combination of mixed refinery gas 
and gas converted during the process is also excluded due to the complexity of the fuel and its 
extremely high emissions. Finally, our sample consists of a panel of 111 boilers (888 observations).  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables. As we can see, there is large variation in 
emissions among boilers. The yearly CO2 and NOx emissions per generating unit vary from zero to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
technology may include: trimming the burner and air supply, LNB (Low NOx burners), OFA (Over Fire Air), 
ROFA (Rotating Over Fire Air), and RGA (flue gas recirculation). 
16
 Each fuel consists of some sub-classifications. For instance, gas may include natural gas, LPG and biogas. Oil 
types are fuel oil 1, fuel oil 5 and bio-oil. In the biofuels we may include several kinds of residues from the forest 
and other types of biomass. To develop the estimations, specific emission factors for every sub-classification 
have been considered (see emission factors in SEPA, 2009). In the case of waste, besides its emission factor, it is 
also assumed that the fossil fraction of the fuel corresponds to 12.6% of the total weight. 
17
 The term combustion means combustion of fuel in the presence of oxygen, in contrast to processes defined as 
reactions between substances, reduction processes, thermic decomposition of substances, and formation of 
substances used as products or process material (see also law NFS 2007:5 3 § point 11 and 29 in SEPA, 2009). 
18
 For comparison purposes, we also estimated the CO2 emissions using the total output per boiler, adjusting it 
by boiler efficiency to obtain the input energy, and distributing it across fuels by means of the energy fuel shares. 
We conducted a statistical mean comparison test of the two procedures and did not find evidence to reject the 
null hypothesis that the means are equal at the 1% significance level. Although the two estimation approaches 
are equivalent, we preferred the first procedure. Another check involved the comparison between the sum of the 
estimated emissions per installation and the corresponding aggregated emissions in the SEPA‟s EU ETS 
database for some installations where it was possible to make such aggregation. Our estimations were in a 
similar order of magnitude. 
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383,000 tons and from 3.9 to 358.5 tons, respectively. This reflects differences within the sector in 
fuel mix, fuel usage, boiler size, and NOx abatement strategies. The amount of useful energy produced 
by an average boiler is around 213 GWh per year in both periods.  
 
  (INSERT TABLE 1 HERE) 
 
IV  Results 
 In this section we describe and analyze the results of our estimates of technical efficiencies, 
substitution elasticities, and shadow prices. We present the results for the pooled sample including 
combining CHP and district heating plants. However, we report results by subgroup when there are 
statistically significant differences in the direction and magnitude of the estimates for CHP and DH 
plants. 
 
4.1 Technical Efficiency and Technical Progress 
 
The estimated coefficients of the quadratic directional output distance function are shown in 
Table 2.  
 
(INSERT TABLE 2 HERE) 
 
Stringent environmental regulations have a positive effect not only on environmental quality, 
but may also have a positive effect on firms‟ efficiency if they induce a more efficient use of 
resources, as well as the development of new technologies. Compliance costs due to stricter 
environmental regulation make environmentally friendlier technological development relatively less 
costly. This should be represented by an outward shift of the production possibility curve or an inward 
shift in the input coefficient space, which means that with a given set of resources it is now possible to 
produce more goods and services without worsening the environmental quality or vice versa 
(Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw, 1999).  
Our results from the Swedish heat and power plants are a case in point and indicate the 
existence of significant technical progress. We compute the frontier for a size range including the 
hypothetically efficient boiler for the years 2001 and 2009 (initial and final year in our sample). As 
shown in Figure 3, technological progress drives a significant movement of the frontier towards 
16 
 
reduced emissions of both pollutants, though as expected, the overall reduction is biased toward CO2 
emissions reduction.
 19
 Figure 3 also shows the actual relative prices of CO2 and NOx emissions for 
each year
20
  and we see that the optimal mix of CO2-NOx emissions (in tons) for the period 2001-
2004 and 2006-2009 is actually found as a corner-solution. This means that it is optimal (in both 
years) for plants to minimize CO2 emissions even at the expense of increasing NOx emissions (for 
example through higher furnace temperatures and through the use of biofuels). The movement of the 
frontier itself is also consistent with the fact that the amount of heat and power generation per unit of 
emissions increases for both pollutants between periods, yet the efficiency increase is much larger in 
the case of CO2. We could thus say that the technical change is “carbon saving” in much the same 
way as technical changes have traditionally often been characterized as “labor saving.” On average, 
CO2 emissions per MWh in the heat and power sector decreased by 20% between the periods (from 
9.4 MWh/ton in 2001-2004 to 11.88 MWh/ton in 2006-2009); and the corresponding reduction for 
NOx was approximately 9% (from 4,822 to 5,337 MWh/ton).  
 
(INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE) 
 
Thus far we have analyzed technical progress at the frontier. We are also interested in the 
performance of all firms, which is conveniently measured by studying technical efficiency relative to 
each respective frontier: We find that out of 111 boilers operating during the period 2001-2009, only 
12 and 11 boilers were found to operate on the frontier during 2001-2004 and 2006-2009, respectively. 
The highest technical and environmental efficiencies are reached by boilers using biofuel while the 
highest inefficiencies are found in boilers burning fossil fuels.
21
 The estimations of technical and 
environmental efficiency yield mean inefficiency values of 23.7% and 33.2% for the pre- and post-
introduction periods of the EU ETS, respectively. This indicates that during 2001-2004, boilers on 
average could have expanded their heat and power generation by 50.71 GWh (i.e., 213.625 0.237) and 
contracted CO2 emissions by 5,392 tons (22,716.4 0.237) and NOx emissions by 11 tons (44.3 0.237) 
had they adopted the best practice of frontier generating units. Similarly, for 2006-2009, boilers could 
have increased their production by 71.07 GWh and decreased their CO2 and NOx emissions by 5,984 
and 13 tons, respectively, had the generating units worked at the frontier. Given these results, the 
amount of possible reduction in emissions and increase in heat and power generation that could have 
                                                          
19
 We also estimated the quadratic directional output distance function for the whole sample (pre- and post-EU 
ETS together) substituting the dummy variables for a time trend, and found technical progress supported by a 
negative coefficient of the time trend. 
20
 The price of CO2 emissions is given by the sum of the carbon permit price and relevant tax – given the fuel 
consumption and fuel mix of a representative firm at the frontier. 
21
 Mean inefficiencies for boilers using biofuel range from 18 to 29%. On the other hand, average inefficiencies 
in boilers employing fossil fuels vary from 49 to 53%.   
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been achieved between the periods following the practice of the most efficient generating units is of 
considerable magnitude. Moreover, the fact that relative inefficiency appears to increase implies that 
technical progress was fastest at the frontier and slower for average plants. In the long run, this 
suggests that considerable further progress can be expected as average plants and laggards catch up 
with the frontier. However, point estimates are not enough if we want to be sure there is a difference in 
relative efficiency between the two periods. We find that the bootstrapped Li et al. (2009) Tn-statistic, 
which allows us to compare the inefficiency distributions, is equal to 19.84 with an empirical p-value 
of 0.924. Hence, by this test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality between the two density 
functions of inefficiencies. 
 
4.2 CO2-Output and NOx-Output Elasticities 
With regard to the pollution-output elasticities, Figures 4a and 4b illustrate the kernel 
distributions of pollution-output between the two periods. When it comes to CO2, the mean output 
elasticity changed from -0.666 to -0.299 between the periods. The mean NOx-output elasticity 
changed from -1.335 to -0.456. Using the Li et al. test, we are able to reject the null hypothesis of 
equality between the density functions of the pollution-output elasticities pre- and post-introduction of 
the EU ETS for both pollutants, i.e., the responsiveness of the ratio of emissions/output to emission 
price decreased. These results indicate that the easiest emission reductions have already been 
undertaken, and that further reductions of CO2 and NOx emissions per unit of output will be very 
difficult to achieve and will only be supported by much higher charges on CO2 and NOx emissions.  
 
(INSERT FIGURE 4a HERE) 
(INSERT FIGURE 4b HERE) 
 
The results in the previous section indicate that several technical measures have been 
implemented in order to reduce emissions. Regarding CO2 emissions, the trend toward phasing out of 
fossil fuels in Sweden has been quite stable over the sampled period and most firms in the sector have 
already switched to “carbon-free” fuels. For instance, in 2009 the fraction of boilers with biofuel 
shares greater than or equal to 80% was approximately 74%. The fraction of boilers using mainly 
fossil fuels was very low (11%). Regarding NOx emissions, the fraction of generating units without 
any abatement measure has declined from 24% to 16% during 2001-2009. Instead, there is now a clear 
trend toward simultaneous adoption of more than one NOx reduction technology (i.e., the fraction of 
units using more than one technology has increased from 16% to 32% in 2001-2009; see Table 3).  
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(INSERT TABLE 3 HERE) 
4.3 CO2-NOx substitution 
One of the main purposes of this study is to assess the existence of substitutability between CO2 
and NOx and the changes induced by regulatory changes. Our results indicate that CO2 and NOx are 
substitutes, though substitution decreased during the period 2006-2009 in response to variations in 
relative prices. For instance, the mean estimates of the Morishima CO2-NOx elasticity (      ) fell 
from 0.680 in 2001-2004 to 0.169 in 2006-2009. The mean estimates of the corresponding elasticity 
NOx-CO2 (      ) fell from 0.319 to 0.114. The asymmetry of the elasticities indicates that the 
substitutability of NOx for CO2 is lower than the substitutability of CO2 for NOx. In other words, 
CO2 emissions are more sensitive than NOx emissions to price changes. Clearly, this is linked to the 
fact that CO2 regulations have a much higher opportunity cost than the NOx fee. A policy implication 
that could be derived from this is that the NOx fee would have to be increased to a much higher level 
than today in order to achieve a substantial reduction in NOx emissions. 
The decreased substitution elasticity is also observed when classifying by fuel groups 
(biofuel>80%, biofuel>rest, and others) and types of NOx abatement technologies. When it comes to 
type of generation (i.e., DH vs. CHP), we observe that for DH plants the mean CO2-NOx elasticity 
(      ) actually increased slightly between the periods, from 0.626 in 2001-2004 to 0.728 in 2006-
2009, which seems logical given that this group faced a higher opportunity cost of CO2 emissions 
after the implementation of the EU ETS (since these plants still have to pay 94% of the Swedish 
carbon tax). Like for the whole sample, the NOx-CO2 elasticity (      ) for DH plants is lower in the 
second period – down from 0.383 in 2001-2004 to 0.237 in 2006-2009. 
 
Kernel distributions of the elasticities between pollutants for the entire sample are depicted in 
Figures 5a and 5b. Using the bootstrapped Li et al. Tn-statistics, we tested the null hypothesis of equal 
density functions between the pre- and post-implementation period of the EU ETS. We reject this null 
hypothesis; the elasticity of substitution CO2-NOx does tend to shift towards the left-hand side of the 
distribution. In the case of the NOx-CO2 elasticity, we also observe that for many generating units the 
estimates are concentrated around zero. Further CO2-NOx substitution has become less likely since 
most firms have already implemented the technical measures that are economically feasible (notably, 
they have almost completely switched to biomass). This trend should be clearer when we exclude from 
the sample all the boilers that are fully operating with bio-fuels (approx. 40% of the sample). As total 
fuel conversion to biofuels is a possible option for this group we should expect to observe a higher 
responsiveness of the relative intensity of emissions CO2/NOx to changes in relative prices, i.e., a 
19 
 
higher elasticity of substitution. Indeed, our estimates indicate that the elasticities of substitution 
between pollutants for this group are generally higher than those estimated for the whole sample, 
though they still statistically decreased during 2006-2009. For instance,        and        fell on 
average from 1.06 to 0.45 and from 0.82 to 0.04, respectively.  
 
(INSERT FIGURE 5a HERE) 
 
(INSERT FIGURE 5b HERE) 
4.4 Shadow Prices 
Finally, we test for changes in the relative CO2/NOx shadow price. Firstly, we estimate the 
shadow prices for the whole sample. Secondly, we estimate the shadow prices by subgroups (CHP and 
DH). For the whole sample, we find a reduced CO2/NOx shadow price for the post-EU ETS 
introduction period. The relative CO2/NOx shadow price per ton decreases from a mean of 0.000085 
in 2001-2004 to a mean of 0.000047 in 2006-2009.  
When we estimate the shadow prices for subgroups, we find that – in line with Figure 2 – for 
CHP plants the relative CO2/NOx shadow price per ton decreased after the introduction of the EU 
ETS, from a mean of 0.000420 in 2001-2004 to 0.000061 in 2006-2009. Yet, not surprisingly, the 
reduction in relative prices does not hold for DH plants. For these generating units, the CO2 shadow 
price became relatively higher than the NOx shadow price (changing from a mean of 1.19e-13/ton in 
2001-2004 to 3.15e-13/ton in 2006-2009), which is in line with the fact that for this group the phasing 
out of the carbon tax has been negligible. Overall, the group of CHP plants dominates on the 
magnitude and direction of the change in the relative prices. A considerable fraction of the plants 
belong to this group (around 74% of the whole sample).   
The Li et al. (2009) test leads us to reject the null hypothesis of equality in the relative shadow 
price distributions between pre- and post-implementation of the EU ETS. Figures 6a and 6b illustrate 
the kernel relative shadow price distributions for CHP and DH plants, respectively. The direction of 
the changes here in relative shadow prices is compatible with the constructed relative prices of the 
regulation for an average DH and an average CHP calculated in Section 2, which confirms that for 
CHP plants the CO2 policy became less stringent since the introduction of the EU ETS, while the 
reverse holds for DH plants.  
 
(INSERT FIGURE 6a HERE) 
(INSERT FIGURE 6b HERE) 
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V. Conclusions  
The implementation of environmental policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions certainly has 
a global impact, but it can also bring local co-benefits (or costs) by reducing (or increasing) other air 
pollutants due to complementarity/substitutability between pollutants. These interactions have clear 
implications for policy design as many European countries are committed to reaching the Kyoto 
obligations (though real action has been slow up to now), and there are currently multiple policies in 
place aiming to reduce CO2 emissions. The question is what ancillary benefits (costs) we can expect 
from pursuing GHG reduction policies and local air pollution policies simultaneously. We explore this 
question formally by analyzing the patterns of substitution between CO2 and NOx in Sweden induced 
by the interaction of national and international environmental policies. 
We modeled the pollution technology of generating units in the Swedish heat and power sector 
as a non-separable production process in which CO2, NOx, and production are treated as joint outputs. 
We use a directional output distance function that counts for the simultaneous expansion of good 
outputs and contraction of bad outputs, which is a fair representation of the problem that many 
regulated firms deal with. We chose a quadratic representation of the technology and subsequently 
derived the estimates of elasticities between CO2 and NOx and heat and power generation. Through 
this method, we computed the impact of the introduction of the EU ETS on the relative shadow price 
and substitutability between CO2 and NOx, as well as the substitutability between emissions and 
power generation for generating units included in the EU ETS. To evaluate the change in elasticities or 
relative shadow prices, we compared the density functions between periods by means of a kernel-
consistent density test.  
Our results indicate that there are important interactions between the abatement efforts of CO2 
and NOx emissions. Indeed, we find that in the heat and power generation sector, CO2 and NOx are 
Morishima substitutes. Overall, the degree of substitution between these two pollutants decreased after 
the introduction of the EU ETS as a response to the regulatory changes that led to a reduced relative 
CO2/NOx price. Nevertheless, for the subgroup of DH plants, for which the carbon tax reduction has 
been so far very small, CO2-NOx substitution increased due to the high relative carbon price they pay. 
The mean estimates of the CO2-NOx elasticities (      ) for the entire sample ranged from 0.680 in 
2001-2004 to 0.169 in 2006-2009, while for DH they changed from 0.626 to 0.728. 
Our results also indicate that CO2 is more sensitive than NOx to prices. The asymmetric 
Morishima NOx-CO2 elasticity (      ) is lower than the CO2-NOx elasticity, which means that if the 
regulator is to encourage a large reduction in NOx emissions, the charge must be increased to a much 
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higher level than today. As in the previous case, the overall mean NOx-CO2 elasticity decreased after 
the introduction of the EU ETS, from 0.319 to 0.114. 
Has the overlapping of climate policies led to increased NOx emissions? We do find a tendency 
in this direction, but NOx emissions did not actually increase for two reasons. First, there was 
significant technological development leading to reduced emissions of both pollutants. Second, 
contrary to what one may expect, the relative CO2/NOx prices decreased for most firms in the heat 
and power sector due to the gradual reduction of the Swedish carbon tax for generating units within 
the EU ETS and the simultaneous increase in the local NOx charge in 2008. This is to say that in 
relative terms, CO2 policies in Sweden became less stringent since the introduction of the EU ETS 
due to the variations in the levels of the local policies, and this has reduced the cost of compliance 
with both CO2 and NOx regulations, as reflected by the reduced shadow prices and pollutant-output 
elasticities. Nevertheless, our results tell us that although firms were able to decrease CO2 and NOx 
emissions per unit of output between the periods 2001-2004 and 2006-2009, further decreases in the 
CO2/output and NOx/output ratios will be more difficult to achieve as most firms have already 
implemented all the technical measures available, and will have to be supported by much higher 
charges on CO2 and NOx emissions. 
Finally, the fact that generating units respond to variation in the relative prices of emissions by 
changing the intensity of their abatement efforts suggests that there is a need for policy coordination to 
avoid unintended effects of one policy instrument on the emissions of other pollutants. This is an area 
where much research is needed since as stated by Elinor Ostrom, we are likely to experience a 
polycentric approach to climate change with mitigation and adaptation activities undertaken by 
multiple policy actors at a range of different scales.  
 
VI. References 
Aigner, D.J., Chu, S.J., 1968. On estimating the industry production function. American Economic 
Review 58: 826-839. 
 
Ambec, S. Coria, J., 2011. Prices vs Quantities with Multiple Pollutants. Working Paper 517, 
Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg. 
 
Blackorby, C., Russell, R.R., 1981. The Morishima elasticity of substitution; symmetry, constancy, 
separability, and its relationship to the Hicks and Allen elasticities. Review of Economic Studies 48: 
147-158. 
 
Blackorby, C., Russell, R.R., 1989. Will the real elasticity of substitution please standup? (A 
comparison of the Allen/Uzawa and Morishima elasticities). American Economic Review 79: 882-
888. 
22 
 
 
Brännlund, R., Kriström, B., 2001. Too hot to handle? Benefits and costs of stimulating the use of 
biofuels in the Swedish heating sector. Resource and Energy Economics 23: 343-358.  
 
Burtraw, D., Krupnick, A., Palmer, K., Paul, A., Toman, M., Bloyd, C., 2003. Ancillary benefits of 
reduced air pollution in the U.S. from moderate greenhouse gas mitigation policies in the electricity 
sector. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 45: 650-673. 
 
Caillaud, B., Jullien, B., Picard, P., 1996. Hierarchical organization and incentives. European 
Economic Review 40: 687-695. 
 
Eichner, T., Pethig, R., 2009. Efficient CO2 emissions control with emissions taxes and International 
emissions trading. European Economic Review 53: 625-635. 
 
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S., Lovell, C.A.K., Yaisawarng, S., 1993. Derivation of shadow prices for 
undesirable outputs: a distance function-approach. Review of Economics and Statistics 75: 374-380. 
 
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S., Noh, D.W., Weber, W., 2001. Shadow prices of Missouri public conservation 
land. Public Finance Review 29: 444-460. 
 
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S., Noh, D.W., Weber, W., 2005. Characteristics of a polluting technology: 
theory and practice. Journal of Econometrics 126: 469-492. 
 
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S., Weber, W., 2006. Shadow prices and pollution costs in U.S. agriculture. 
Ecological Economics 56: 89-103. 
 
Färe, R., Martins-Filho, C., Vardanyan, M., 2010. On functional form representation of multi-output 
production technologies. Journal of Productivity Analysis 33: 81-96. 
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S., Pasurka, C. A., Weber, W., 2012. Substitutability among undesirable outputs. 
Applied Economics 44: 39-47. 
Hayfield, T., Racine, J.S, 2008. Nonparametric Econometrics: The np Package. Journal of Statistical 
Software 27: 1-32. Available at www.jstatsoft.org/v27/i05/ (Nov. 27, 2011). 
 
Hayfield, T, Racine, J.S., 2011. Nonparametric kernel smoothing methods for mixed data types: 
Package „np‟. Available at http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/np/ (Nov. 27, 2011). 
 
Höglund, L., 2005. Abatement costs in response to the Swedish charge on nitrogen oxide emissions. 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 50: 102-120. 
 
Kumar, S., Managi, S., 2011. Non-separability and substitutability among water pollutants: evidence 
from India. Environment and Development Economics. In press. 
 
Li, Q., 1996. Nonparametric testing of closeness between two unknown distribution functions. 
Econometric Reviews 15: 261-274. 
 
23 
 
Li, Q., 1999. Nonparametric testing the similarity of two unknown density functions: local power and 
bootstrap analysis. Nonparametric Statistics 11: 189–213. 
 
Li, Q., Maasoumi, E., Racine, J.S., 2009. A nonparametric test for equality of distributions with mixed 
categorical and continuous data. Journal of Econometrics 148: 186-200. 
 
Löfgren, Å., Muller, A.., 2010. Swedish CO2 emissions 1993-2006: An application of decomposition 
analysis and some methodological insights. Environmental and Resource Economics 47: 221-239. 
 
Millock, K., Sterner, T., 2004. NOx Emissions in France and Sweden. In Choosing Environmental 
Policy, Comparing Instruments and Outcomes in the United States and Europe. W. Harrington, R.D. 
Morgenstern and T. Sterner (editors), RFF Press, Washington, DC, United States. 
 
Murty, M.N., S. Kumar, Dhavala, K.K., 2007. Measuring environmental efficiency of industry: a case 
study of thermal power generation in India. Environmental and Resource Economics 38: 31-50. 
 
Nijkamp, P., Rietveld, P., 1981. Multi-Objective Multi-Level Policy Models, an Application to 
Regional and Environmental Planning. European Economic Review 15: 63-89 
 
SEPA, 2003. Kväveoxidavgiften ett effektivt styrmedel Utvärdering av NOx-avgiften. Rapport 5335. 
http://www.naturvardsverket.se/Documents/publikationer/620-5335-3.pdf 
 
SEPA, 2007. Economic Instruments in Environmental Policy. Report 5678. 
http://www.energimyndigheten.se/Global/Engelska/News/620-5678-6_webb.pdf 
 
SEPA, 2009. Naturvårdsverkets föreskrifter och allmänna råd om utsläppsrätter för koldioxid. NFS 
2007:5 Konsoliderad med NFS 2009:6. Stockholm. 
 
Sterner, T., Höglund, L., 2006. Refunded emission payments theory, distribution of costs, and Swedish 
experience of NOx abatement. Ecological Economics 57: 93-106. 
 
Sterner, T., Turnheim, B., 2009. Innovation and diffusion of environmental technology: Industrial 
NOx abatement in Sweden under refunded emission payments. Ecological Economics 68: 2996-3006. 
 
Stiroh, K.J., 1999. Measuring Input Substitution in Thrifts: Morishima, Allen-Uzawa, and Cross-Price 
Elasticities. Journal of Economics and Business  51:145-157 
 
Svensk Fjärrvärme, 2011. Combined heat and power. Available at www.svenskfjarrvarme.se (Oct. 5, 
2011). 
 
Swedish Energy Agency, 2009. Energy in Sweden 2009. Stockholm. 
 
Xepapadeas, A., de Zeeuw, A., 1999. Environmental Policy and Competitiveness: The Porter 
Hypothesis and the Composition of Capital. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
37: 165-182.  
24 
 
Appendix A. The optimization problem 
In order to estimate the directional output distance function in (5), we solve the following 
optimization problem: 
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Constraint (a) is the feasibility condition for each generating unit‟s observation and corresponds to 
property (i). Restrictions in (b) are imposed to satisfy the monotonicity conditions of emissions and 
good output described in (ii) and (iii), respectively. Monotonicity of inputs at the mean level of input 
usage is included in constraint (c), which satisfies property (iv). In order to ensure estimates in the 
positive slope of the output set, we incorporate restrictions in (d); note that the first of these constraints 
is related as well with the concavity property in (v) since the first leading principal minor of the 
hessian matrix is non-positive. The null-jointness property in (vii) is imposed by constraint (e). This 
restriction implies in other words that if  ⃗  
 (  
    
       )    then the output vector (   ) is not 
feasible. Condition (f) ensures the translation property in (viii), which is parametrically specified by 
equation (6) (see Färe et al., 2006). Finally, the symmetry conditions defined in (7) are imposed by 
constraint (g).  
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Appendix B. The Tn-statistic of Li et al (2009) 
The Tn-statistic is a nonparametric consistent test that assesses the equality between two density 
functions,  ( ) and  ( ) of a random variable x. Let *  +   
   and *  +   
   be i.i.d. observations from 
populations with density functions  ( )  and  ( ) , and  (
    
 
)  be a univariate kernel function 
associated with the continuous variable x, where h is the corresponding smoothing parameter
22
. The 
product kernel is represented by        
   (
    
 
). Thus, the density functions  ( ) and  ( ) are 
estimated as follows: 
 ̂( )  
 
  
∑                ̂( )  
 
  
∑      
  
    
  
       . 
Li et al. (2009) constructed the Tn-statistic based on the integrated squared difference, In , that 
serves as a measure of the closeness between  ( ) and  ( ): 
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The Tn-statistic is calculated by  ̂  (     )
  ⁄     ̂ 
 
→  (   ) , where the variance is 
obtained by: 
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22
 Given that the selection of the smoothing parameter is very important in nonparametric estimation, it is 
suggested to estimate h by cross validation using the pooled sample (see Li et al., 2009). 
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Figure 1. The CO2 Tax in Sweden during 2001-2009 for the heat and power sector 
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2005- June 2008: 100% of CO2 tax 
July 2008- 2009: 94% of CO2 tax 
 
Combined Heat and Power (CHP): 
2005- June 2008: 21% of CO2 tax  
July 2008- 2009: 15% of CO2 tax 
Within 
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Yes  
Other heat production: 
2005-2009: 100% of CO2 tax No  
District heating plants and other heat 
production: 
2001-2004: 100% of CO2 tax 
 
Combined Heat and Power (CHP): 
2001-2003: 100% of CO2 tax 
2004: 21% of CO2 tax  
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District heating plants, CHP 
or other heat production: 
2001-2004: 0% of CO2 tax 
 
District heating plants and 
CHP: 
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Other heat production: 
2005-2009: 0% of CO2 tax 
 
Heating fuels not covered by the EU Energy Taxation 
Directive 
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and fats, biogas, etc. 
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Wood, wood chips, pellets, residues 
from forest industry, tall oil etc. 
Heating fuels covered by the EU Energy Taxation 
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Oil, coal, natural gas, LPG, 
etc. 
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District heating plants, CHP or other 
heat production: 
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District heating plants and CHP: 
2005: 0% of CO2 tax 
2006: 100% of CO2 tax since July only for 
fossil carbon content of waste. 
2007-2009: 100% of CO2 tax only for fossil 
carbon content of waste. 
Other heat production: 
2005: 0% of CO2 tax 
2006: 100% of CO2 tax since July only for 
fossil carbon content of waste. 
2007-2009: 100% of CO2 tax only for fossil 
carbon content of waste. 
 
Carbon tax scheme 
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Figure 2. Average relative opportunity costs CO2/NOx per MWh  
for CHP and DH plants
(1,2)
. 
 
 
 
 (1) The opportunity cost of CO2 emissions is calculated as the sum of the carbon tax 
plus the CO2 EU ETS price (mean of forward contracts 2007-2013).  
(2) 
We compute the relative CO2/NOx opportunity cost per MWh per boiler and 
average the values across boilers. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Description Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
2001-2004 
Y Useful energy (GWh) 213.6 226.4 26.1 1292.8 
b1 CO2 (tons) 22716 51772 0.0 350320 
b2 NOx (tons) 44.3 42.7 3.9 358.5 
b1/Y CO2(tons)/GWh 75.6    127.1 0 695.2 
b2/Y NOx(tons)/GWh 0.25 0.09 0.03 0.57 
x1 Installed capacity (MW) 68.3 93.0 6 600 
x2 Fuel consumption (GWh) 227.7 240.1 23.6 1247.1 
x3 Labor (no. of employees) 33.7 41.6 1.0 220.4 
2006-2009 
Y Useful energy (GWh) 213.9 246.1 25.1 1232.6 
b1 CO2 (tons) 18012 51993 0.0 382960 
b2 NOx (tons) 40.1 37.8 5.0 258.6 
b1/Y CO2(tons)/GWh 63.1 124.7 0 722.7 
b2/Y NOx(tons)/GWh 0.24 0.09 0.03 0.68 
x1 Installed capacity (MW) 66.8 90.9 5 600 
x2 Fuel consumption (GWh) 226.1 259.8 23.7 1334.8 
x3 Labor (no. of employees) 39.6 46.4 2.2 265.9 
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Table 2: Parameter estimates of the quadratic directional output distance function 
 
Coefficients Variable Before EU ETS After EU ETS 
  
2001-2004 2006-2009 
  Constant 0.023 -0.045 
      -0.002 0.051 
      0.323 0.449 
      -0.026 0.052 
   Y -0.567 -0.609 
      -0.001 0.001 
      0.434 0.390 
      
  -0.012 -0.017 
         -0.153 -0.099 
         0.021 -0.065 
      
  0.040 -0.053 
         -0.016 0.085 
      
  0.020 -0.052 
    
  -0.180 -0.063 
      
  -0.002 -0.001 
      
  -0.182 -0.064 
         0.007 0.018 
         -0.003 -0.001 
         0.012 0.003 
         0.066 0.047 
         0.273 0.142 
         0.001 0.016 
       0.000 0.000 
       -0.180 -0.063 
         0.002 0.001 
       0.073 0.065 
       0.270 0.133 
       0.014 0.019 
Year dummies are not shown in the table. 
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Figure 3: Frontiers for a hypothetical technically efficient boiler in 2001 and 2009 
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Figure 4a: Kernel distribution of CO2-output elasticities
23
 
 
Figure 4b: Kernel distribution of NOx-output elasticities 
 
 
 
                                                          
23
 For convenience in presentation, some elasticity estimates of CO2-output lower than -3 and of NOx-output 
less than -10 are not shown in the graphs. 
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Table 3: CO2 and NOx abatement technology adoption 
 
  % of boilers according to fuel type % boilers with NOx technology 
Year 
Biofuel
a
 
(>80%) 
Mostly Fossil 
fuel
a
 
(>80%) 
Mostly Mostly 
None 
Only 
PCT 
Only CT 
PCT and 
CT   Biofuelb  
Fossil 
Fuel
b
  
Others
b
  
2001 71.2 80.2 9.9 12.6 7.2 24.3 16.2 43.2 16.2 
2002 64.0 75.7 9.9 12.6 10.8 22.5 16.2 45.0 16.2 
2003 67.6 78.4 11.7 13.5 7.2 21.6 15.3 45.9 17.1 
2004 68.5 79.3 10.8 12.6 7.2 21.6 15.3 45.0 18.0 
2006 74.8 81.1 9.9 12.6 6.3 18.0 15.3 45.0 21.6 
2007 71.2 79.3 9.9 10.8 9.0 18.0 12.6 41.4 27.9 
2008 73.9 82.0 9.0 10.8 7.2 17.1 11.7 40.5 30.6 
2009 73.9 82.9 9.0 10.8 6.3 16.2 11.7 40.5 31.5 
 
a “Biofuel” and “fossil fuel" (>80%) includes all the boilers with a fuel share equal to or greater than 80%. 
b “Mostly biofuel” is the fraction of boilers with a biofuel share greater than the fossil fuel share and also a biofuel share greater than the fuel 
share of other fuels. “Mostly fossil fuel” includes boilers with a fossil fuel share higher than the biofuel share and also a fossil fuel share 
greater than the fuel share of other fuels. “Mostly others” is defined in a similar manner for other fuels (peat and waste). 
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Figure 5a: Kernel distribution of CO2-NOx elasticities
24
 
 
Figure 5b: Kernel distribution of NOx-CO2 elasticities 
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 For convenience in presentation, some elasticity estimates of CO2-NOx higher than 5 and of NOx-CO2 higher 
than 1 are not shown in the graphs. 
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Figure 6a: Kernel distribution of relative CO2/NOx shadow prices – CHP plants25 
 
Figure 6b: Kernel distribution of relative CO2/NOx shadow prices – DH plants 
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 For convenience in presentation some few relative shadow price estimates greater than 0.008 for CHP and 
higher than 1e-12 for DH are not shown in the graphs. 
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